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LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE DISTRICT
OF COL MBIA'S VITAL RECORDS ACT: MEDICAL
CAUSE OF DEATH PRIVACY
Suzanne Brette Greene
INTRODUCTION

Is there a privacy intrest in cause of death information that warrants restricting
access to that information? The answer to this question varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and some jurisdictions have not answered it at all. The District of
Columbia has determined that a sufficient privacy interest exists and therefore
restricts disclosure of the death certificate to only those persons who can show a
"direct and tangible interest"' to attain access to information. Three state courts
that have faced this issue developed a balancing test to use when deciding whether
to disclose information to an applicant.2 These state courts balance the individual's
privacy intrest against the public intrest to this information. This balancing test
may prove to be a workable solution for states as the number of deaths increase
from AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) and other diseases that
carry a social stigma.s However, a more effective solution would be for each state
to enact specific legislation addressing this conflict between competing interests.
The District of Columbia has addressed the issue of cause of death disclosure by
enacting D.C. Law 9-180, which became effective on March 13, 1993, and which
amended certain portions of the Vital Records Act of 1981.' Specifically, the
pertinent provisions of D.C. Law 9-180 require that each death certificate separate
the pronouncement of death section from the medical certification of cause of
death section. 5 This amendment to the Vital Records Act also provides that the

1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-220(a)(4) (Sp. 1981)
2. Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 294 A.2d 646 (Conn. 1971) (applying balancing test); Carlo= v.
Pima County, 687 P.2d 1242 (Ariz. 1984); Tri-State Publishing Co.. A Division of Ottaway Newspapers v.
City of Port Jervis, 523 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1988).
3. Because the recording of death certificates is a state function, federal courts do not have to be
concerned with weighing privacy interests of a deceased person. States may have to change this balancing test
by inserting the privacy intrests of the decedent's family for the decedent's privacy interests4. D.C. LAw 9-180, Medical Cause of Death Privacy and Expected Death at Home Vital Records and
Kenilworth-Parkside Equitable Water and Sewer Service Relief Amendment Act of 1992. (Section 3 of D.C.
Law 9-180, concerning the forgiveness of certain interest, penalties, fees, and other charges assessed against
the Kenilworth-Parkside Resident Management Corporation, will not be discussed in this writing.)
5. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-211(i) (1981).
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pronouncement of death' section on the death certificate could be signed by an
attending registered nurse", in the case of an expected death and when the death
occurs at the decedent's residence.
The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the significance of the
separated medical cause of death section on the death certificate in the District of
Columbia. Part I examines in detail the amendments to the Vital Records Act of
1981 found in D.C. Law 9-180. Part II analyzes other states' statutes which
provide for variations of disclosure and copying of death certificates. Section B of
Part II compares state statutes having similar distribution restrictions of the cause
of death section to the District of Columbia Law 6-211. Section C of Part 11
examines state statutes that require an applicant to demonstrate a direct and
tangible interest in the record. Section D of Part II then examines more permissive
states which do not restrict public records disclosure. Finally, Part III of this note
discusses newspapers' interest in accessing the medical cause of death section of
the death certificate when the decedent is alleged to have died from AIDS. In this
regard, this note will examine the adequacy of the balancing test applied in several
states and the need for more effective state legislation.
I. D.C. LAW 9-180 AND THE VITAL RECORDS ACT OF 1981
D.C. Law 9-180 amended Section 6-211 of the Vital Records Act of 1981 by
changing the requirements of the death certificate. The law provides that every
death certificate separate the pronouncement of death section from the medical
certification of cause of death section. 8 As before the amendment, the
pronouncement of death section must include the personal data of the decedent, as
well as the place and date of death. 9 Those facts relating to the medical cause or
causes of death shall only be recorded in the medical certification portion of the
death certificate.10
Distribution of a death certificate is governed by Section 6-220 of the Vital
Records Act of 19811" which relates to the distribution of copies or data from the

6. -Expected Death" is defined as a death from a previously diagnosed illness with a prognosis of death
in less than six (6) months. DC CODE ANN. § 6-201(4A) (1993 Supp.).
7. DC. CODE ANN. § 6-211(j) (1981 & Supp. 1993).
8. D.C CODE ANN. § 6-211(i) (1981 & Supp. 1993).
9. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-211(a) and (c) (1981).
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-211(i) (1981 & Supp. 1993).
II. D.C CODE ANN § 6-220 (1981).

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

vital records to the public. Section 6-220 provided that any registrant who was
able to show a "direct and tangible interest" in a requested record was entitled to
the information contained therein.1 2 Specifically, D.C. Law 9-180 imposed a limit
on the type of information that even a qualified registrant having a direct and
tangible interest could initially receive from the death certificate. The amendment
provides that the registrant make a specific request for a certified copy of the
medical certification of cause of death section. 13 Thus, by requiring that the death
certificate contain two sections, the legislature has provided greater privacy for the
families of the deceased.
Even under the amendment, however, some applicants seeking information are
deemed to have a need to know that outweighs privacy intrests. The amendments
to the Vital Records Act of 1981 addressed this by retaining existing code
provisions that allow disclosure of information in vital records for insurance,
research, national vital statistics, and other limited statistical or administrative
purposes.' 4 The original death certificate, containing both the pronouncement and
cause of death, remains at the District of Columbia Government for public health
records.

IL

THE NATURE OF PUBuC RECORDS LAWS AND

A.

General

ACCESS To DEATH CERTiFICATES

The Illinois Court of Appeals has stated that it is good public policy to allow
liberal examination of public records."5 However, as will be developed in the
remainder of this section, states have varied on what constitutes good public policy
with regard to providing copies of information contained in vital records,
particularly in death certificate disclosure.
B.

The District of Columbia Approach: Medical Cause of Death Privacy

As described in Part I, the District of Columbia has enacted legislation which
exempts the medical cause of death section of the death certificate from general

12.
13.
14.
15.

D.C
D.C

CODE ANN
CODE ANN
D.C CODE ANN

§ 6-220(a) (1981).
§ 6-220(a)(4) (1981).
§ 6-220(g)(1) (1981).

People ex rel Gibson v. Peller,
181 N.E.2d 376 (111.App. 1962).
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public disclosure in the form of copies." D.C. Law 9-180 provides for two separate
sections to the death certificate."7 The pronouncement and the cause of death
sections are limited to persons having a direct and tangible interest'0 in the death.
Additionally, in order to receive the medical cause of death section, a person must
also make a specific request for that information.' 9 By providing a specific
exemption for medical cause of death, the District of Columbia has created one of
the strictest privacy protection statutes in the nation. The District of Columbia
statute has not been challenged on any grounds, but a small minority of other
similar state statutes have been unsuccessfully challenged.
Florida is one such state which enacted legislation in an attempt to restrict
disclosure of the cause of death section of the death certificate.20 Section 382.008
(6) of the Florida Code makes the cause of death section confidential and exempt
2
from disclosure in the form of copies under the Florida Public Records Act. '
However, the confidential portions of the death certificate can be issued to only the
2
immediate family or family representative. 1

16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-220 (1981).
17. D.C CODE ANN § 6-211(i) (1983 & Supp. 1993).
18. D.C. CODE ANN § 6-220(a) provides the following with respect to the direct and tangible interest
requirement of the applicant: (I) the registrant, a member of his or her immediate family, his or her guardian,
or their respective legal representatives shall be considered to have a direct and tangible interest. Others may
demonstrate a direct and tangible interest when information is needed for determination or protection of a
personal or property right: (2) the term "legal representative" shall include an attorney, physician, funeral
director, or other authorized agent acting in behalf of the registrant or his or her family; (3) The natural
parents of adopted children, when neither has custody, and commercial firms or agencies requesting listings of
names and addresses shall not be considered to have a direct and tangible interest. "Direct and tangible
interest" will be discussed more fully infra part II.C.
19. D.C CODE ANN § 6-220(a)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1993) states a qualified applicant will only receive
the pronouncement of death section if the applicant makes a specific request for the cause of death section.
Illinois requires a similar request requirement to receive the cause of death section (Illinois Vital Records and
Public Health Acts).
20. FLA. STAT ANN § 382.008(6) (1985). Other states include: Tennessee, TEN' CODE ANN § 68-3205 (1993) (specifically listing the individuals and circumstances under which a certified copy of the cause of
death information will be issued); North Dakota N D CENT CODE § 23-02.1-27, 28 (1985) (only allowing
disclosure of the cause of death section to a relative, personal representative, or attorney of a relative); and
Illinois. ILL REV STAT ch. 535 para. 25 (1993) (allows disclosure of the cause of death section upon specific
request by a person having a genealogical, personal or property right interest in the death certificate).
21.

FLA STAT ANN § 382.008 (1985).

22. FLA STAT ANN 29 § 382.025(4) (Supp. 1985) Although Florida does not use the term "direct and
tangible interest". this ection is similar to D.C CODE AN% 6-220 (1981) which uses that phrase. In 1987,
this section of the Florida (ode was re-written. The former section required a direct and tangible interest to
receive a certified copy of the medikal cause of death portion of the death certificate. FIA STAT ANN 29
§ 382.35(4) (Supp. 1985)
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In Yeste v. Miami Herald PublishingCompany,2 3 the Florida District Court of
Appeals upheld Florida Statute Annotated section 382.025 which provides privacy
protection of the cause of death section of the death certificate. In Yeste, a
newspaper filed for a writ of mandamus requiring the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, Bureau of Vital Statistics, to authorize inspection of the
medical certification of Dr. Yeste. The Florida Court held that the legislature's
specific exemption from allowing copies of the cause of death portion of the death
certificate clearly established a legislative intent to keep that section confidential. 2 '
The court further stated:
The underlying justification for making such cause of death information
confidential seems obvious enough. The cause of death as stated in a death
certificate represents sensitive and generally private information. If made
public, this information could cause public embarrassment to the deceased's
family, as, for example, where the deceased has died from an illegal drug
overdose, by suicide, or from a socially distasteful disease such as venereal
disease. Absent some direct or tangible interest in the deceased's cause of
death, it was thought best to keep this portion of the death certificate
confidential and deleted so as to spare the feelings of the deceased's family.
Obviously, that purpose is totally defeated if any member of the general
public may, as urged, inspect and hand copy the confidential portions of the
death certificate. 5
The Florida Attorney General attempted to clarify whether death certificates
are subject to the provisions of the Florida Public Records Law.20 The Attorney
General concluded that death certificates are open for general inspection and
examination; however, in order to receive a copy of the medical cause of death
section of the death certificate, the applicant must demonstrate a direct and
tangible interest in the death certificate. 27 Thus, the medical cause of death section
of the death certificate has been made confidential by implication in Florida."
The policy forwarded in the Yeste decision would appear equally applicable to
the recently enacted District of Columbia statute. Both Florida and the District of
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

451 So.2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
16 Op. Att'y Gen. 39 (1982).
Id.

28.

See Yeste. 451 So.2d at 494.

VITAL RECORDS ACT

Columbia seek to prevent cause of death sections that may carry social stigmas
from disclosure to the general public. Thus, the District of Columbia's statute
requiring a specific request for the cause of death section of the death certificate
separate from that of the pronouncement of death, should withstand challenge in
9
future litigation based upon this pervasive authority from Florida.2
Virginia goes one step further than either Florida or the District of Columbia by
permitting inspection, disclosure, or copying of information contained in any vital
record only by court order or by Board of Health regulation. Virginia's disclosure
statute 1 also specifically removes vital statistics from the provisions of Virginia's
32
Freedom of Information Act.
C.

The Qualified Applicant Approach

Many states have enacted statutes requiring an applicant be "qualified" in order
to receive cause of death information. These statutes require interests that are
"direct," 33 "direct and legitimate, ' 34 "direct and tangible," 3 5 or "proper" ° No
matter how these states describe the requisite interest, the results are essentially
the same. The qualified applicant is eligible for access, disclosure, and, in some
states, copies of the complete death certificate, including the medical cause of
death section. Because the results are similar, the interests required by each
statute should be examined to determine if the statutory definition of "qualified
applicant" properly insures privacy.
Colorado is a "qualified applicant" state that requires an applicant to
demonstrate a "direct and tangible interest" in the death certificate in order to
qualify to receive a copy.37 Although the Colorado legislature has not defined what

29. With the growing number of AIDS-related deaths, this statute may become the focal point of ruturc
litigation. The AIDS issue will be discussed more fully infra Part II.C.
30. VA. CODE ANN § 32.1-271(a) (Michie 1983) ("To protect the integrity of vital records and to
ensure the efficient and proper administration of the system of vital records, it shall be unlawful, for any
person to permit inspection of or to disclose information contained in vital records or to issue a copy of all or
part of any such vital records except as authorized by regulation of the board or when so ordered by a court of
this commonwealth.").
31. Id.; see also 84-85 Op. Att'y Gen. 170 (1985).
32. VA CODE ANN § 2.1-340.1 el seq. (1983).
33. IND. CODE § 16-37-1 8 (Supp. 1993).
34. ME REV. STAT -NN 22 § 2706 (West 1974).
35. GA CODE ANN § 31-10-26 (Supp. 1982).
36. ALA. CODE § 22-9A-21(a) (Supp. 1992).
37. COLO REV STAT § 25-2-117 (1963).
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constitutes a direct and tangible interest,3 the Colorado Court of Appeals held
that the Registrar of Vital Statistics has limited discretion over the furnishing of
this information.39 The Court decided that an applicant has a direct and tangible
interest when that person can demonstrate a significant relationship to the
decedent. 40 However, an applicant does not possess a direct and tangible interest
when the copy of the vital record is sought for commercial purposes.'
New Hampshire also requires that an applicant show a direct and tangible
interest in the death certificate . 2 The New Hampshire statute defines what
constitutes a direct and tangible interest, and the statute includes in that definition
qualified members of the news media seeking information of a public nature.'8
However, because death certificates contain information which would reveal the
identity of the subject of the record, the media is not allowed to inspect this
m
information.
" Few would contest the fact that AIDS is a public health concern,
but many would agree the social stigma attached to AIDS warrants a private
concern and non-disclosure of death certificates to the public and media.'0
In a 1988 New Hampshire Attorney General Opinion, the issue of disclosure of
death certificates was once again addressed.' In that opinion, the attorney general
decided that the press was entitled to access death certificates so long as the cause
of death was not attributable to a communicable disease.' 7 The Attorney General

38. Cf. D.C CODE ANN. § 220 (1981) (defining what constitutes a direct and tangible interest).
39. Eugene Cervi & Co. v. Russell, 506 P.2d 748 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972). a d.. 519 P.2d 1189 (Colo.
1974).
40. Id. at 750.
41. Id.
42. N.H. REV STAT ANN § 126:14 (1985).
43. Id. Specifically. N.H REV STAT ANN. § 126:14 (1985) provides as follows: (i) The registrant, a
member of his immediate family, his guardian, or their respective legal representatives shall be considered to
have a direct and tangible interest. Others may demonstrate a direct and tangible interest when information is
needed for determination or protection of a personal or property right. (ii) The term "legal representative7
shall include an attorney, physician, funeral director, or other authorized agent acting in behalf or the
registrant or his family. (iii) Commercial firms or agencies requesting a listing of names and addresses shall
not be considered to have a direct and tangible interest. (iv) Properly qualified members of the press, radio.
television, and other news media shall be considered to have a direct and tangible interest in vital statistic
records when the information requested by such media sources is of a public nature. (v) Disclosure of certain
information and statistical data to federal, state, or local agencies and research for legitimate genealogical
purposes may be authorized by the registrar under rules adopted by the director, division of public health
services.
44. 87 Op. Att'y Gen. N.H. 066 (1987).
45. Id.
46. 88 Op. Att'y Gen. N.H. 039 (1988).
47. Id.
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reasoned that the release of a death certificate of an individual who died from a
communicable disease would be more likely to cause embarrassment or
humiliation to the living relatives and that the disease is more likely to be present
in these living relatives."8 However, this opinion does not withstand scrutiny based
on settled legal principles of standing to assert privacy interest.
Generally, a cause of action based upon an alleged violation of an individual's
privacy right does not survive that individual's death.4 Thus, it would appear that
a family member could not assert a decedent's privacy right unless his or her own
privacy was in some way violated. 50 Based on this reasoning, there appears to be a
potential for conflict depending on who the state believes is asserting a privilege of
confidentiality.
New York has followed the decedent's privacy right theory and has taken a
stance opposite from New Hampshire on disclosure of death certificates where the
cause of death is alleged to be linked to the AIDS virus. The New York Supreme
Court held that AIDS is a matter of great public concern and that the media is
entitled to disclosure of the death certificate of a person alleged to have acquired
the AIDS virus.5 1 The court concluded personal privacy rights may not be asserted
by others after the decedent's death.5 2 Furthermore, disclosure of the death
certificate would serve a proper purpose 3 and is warranted under the Freedom of
Information Law.5"
AIDS-related deaths are now a fact of life, and the public disclosure of death
certificates where AIDS was listed as the cause, or one of the causes of death, is
an issue every state will eventually have to face. Future legislatures will have to
determine if the privacy interest of an individual can outweigh the need for public
awareness of AIDS. Continual practice of non-disclosure can only add to the social
stigma of AIDS. Until AIDS, and not the victims, is viewed odiously, this conflict

48. Id.
49. See generally Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 419 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1969): Marzen v.
United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 632 F. Supp. 785, 808 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (citing Silets v.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 591 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. III. 1984), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1004 (1984)), afl'd,
825 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1987); Maritote v. Desilu Prods., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 883
(1965); W. Page Keeton etal., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 112. at 785 (5th ed. 1984).
50. KEETON. at § 117: James v Screen Gems, Inc., 344 P.2d 799 (Cal.App. 1959).
51 Tri-State Publishing Co.. A Division of Ottaway Newspapers v. City of Port Jervis, 523 N.Y.S.2d
954 (1988).

52.
53.
54.
N.Y.S.2d

Id. at 957.
Id. at 957-958
Id. at 957.; Federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1976); Tri-State. 523
at 957
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of interests will not cease.
D.

The Free Access Approach

At common law, the public was considered to have a free right of access to all
public records.5 5 Following this common law rule, Michigan by statute allows any
applicant to receive a copy of a death certificate upon making a written request for
the same. 6The Michigan statute specifically includes the cause of death section of
the death certificate as part of the copy receivable by any applicant." By expressly
including the cause of death in the accessible portion of the death certificate,
Michigan has avoided the question whether AIDS-related information in the death
certificate will be disclosed.5 8
Other examples of free access to "any applicant" include California," which
permits a copy of the death certificate to be supplied to any applicant upon
requesting the same. Ohio 0 allows the issuance of a copy of a vital record to any
applicant. South Dakota"1 requires the Department of Health to issue a copy of a
death certificate to any applicant upon request. While these "free access" statutes
appear to allow disclosure and inspection of the entire death certificate, one might
still argue that the cause of death section should be kept confidential because
cause of death section disclosure is not specifically included in these statutes as it
is in the Michigan statute. 2
Similarly, Nevada statutorily provides that all public records, including death
certificates, should be open to inspection by the public.Y' However, the Nevada

55. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F Supp. 778 (R.I. 1978). resId. 602 F 2d 1010 (Ist
Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980); Julian v United States Dcp't or Justice, 806 F 2d 1411 (9th
Cir. 1986), affd, 486 U.S. 1 (1988); Schwartz v. United States Dcp't of Justice. 435 F. Supp. 1203 (D.C.
1977): Asbury Park Press Inc. v. State Dep't of Health, 558 A.2d 1363 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989);
Philadelphia Newspaper Inc. v. State Dept of Law Public Safety Div. of State Police. 557 A.2d 688 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).

56.

MICH CoMP LAWS

§ 333.2882 (1987).

57. Id.
58. Michigan is the only state that expressly includes the cause of death in the statute dealing with
distribution of certified copies of death certificates. MtCH CowtP LAvs § 3332882 (1987).

59.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §

10575 (1988).

60. OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.23 (Baldwin 1989).
61. S.D CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-25-52 (1980).
62. Contra Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 690 F.2d 252
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that Freedom of Information Acts must be construed broadl) to allow for maximum
public access).
63. NEv REV STAT ANN § 440.170 (Michie 1941).
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Attorney General has opined that, while death certificates are presumed to be open
to public inspection, these certificates may be deemed confidential where disclosure
of the information contained in the death certificate would lead to an unwarranted
invasion of privacy."' The State Attorney General further stated that such a
situation might occur where the information disclosed relates to communicable
diseases which would cause irreparable harm to the decedent's survivors or to the
decedent's reputation.6 5
Using the Nevada statute as an example, it becomes apparent that statutes that
have not expressly defined what information is accessible to the public could face
serious challenges in the future.66 Under this type of statute, courts will have to
proceed on a case-by-case basis. The balancing test, weighing privacy rights of the
individual against the public's right to know, might prove to be a solution for
courts forced to approach this issue on a case-by-case basis. 7 However, state
legislatures should take the initiative by amending statutes to define specifically
what information is publicly accessible.
Vermont is unique in its treatment of the vital records disclosure issue. The
Vermont legislature enacted legislation that provides for the publication of all
births, deaths, and marriages recorded by the end of the preceding calendar year
in an annual town report.6 8 Nowhere in Vermont's statutory scheme does the
legislature provide for the accessibility of public records or the availability of
copies of vital records. This limited statutory scheme will force the Vermont courts
to deal with issues concerning the disclosure of public records on a case-by-case
basis.6 9

IlI.

THE BALANCING TEST: THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW VS. THE INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Generally, a newspaper does not possess any rights that the ordinary citizen does

64. 90 Op. Att'y Gen. Nev. 8 (1990).
65. Id.
66. For example, courts in these jurisdictions will have to answer questions concerning the release of
death certificates which , ontain a certification or medical cause of death section listing AIDS as one of the
causes of death.
67. See supra note 51
68. Vr STAT A\\ tit 18, § 5006 (1961).
69. See supra notes 51 and 66.
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not possess. 70 A newspaper has the right to inspect only those records which are
open to the public generally.71 Under the New Hampshire statute, however,
qualified members of the news media are considered to have a direct and tangible
72
interest if the requested information is of a public nature.
As previously referenced, two state courts have applied a balancing test to
resolve the conflict between the public's right to know and the individual's privacy
interest.7 3 Likewise, courts have held that the public's right to know should be
limited to those records which are of public interest or have a legitimate news
74
value.
Courts in states favoring the public's right to know have held there is no general
right to privacy under the common law.7 5 However, the Texas Supreme Court has
recognized a common law privacy right where disclosure would divulge intimate or
embarrassing facts that would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities and
where disclosure serves no legitimate public concern. 70 Additionally, one state
attorney general opined that information in the cause of death section related to
AIDS or communicable diseases should be kept confidential based on an
individual's privacy interests.7
In light of the powerful interests on both sides of the balance, the potential for
unresolved controversy regarding public and private interests is obvious. State
legislatures are empowered to enact legislation that will lead to a more efficient
and equitable result for both interests. The District of Columbia Council has used
this power to enact legislation that would provide a framework for the District of
Columbia courts to base decisions upon.7 8 The District of Columbia Code
Section 6-220 gives the courts direction by providing specific definitions of public
and privacy interests." Privacy interests in the death certificate are protected by
statutorily required "direct and tangible" interests to attain access to vital
records."0 Public interests are found in the exceptions provided in the Code that

70.

See. e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Grand Forks Herald. Inc. v.

Lyons. 101 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1960).
71. Tri-State. 403 U.S. at 713.
72. N.H. REv STAT ANN § 126:14(IV).
73. See supra notes 2. 51, and 67.
74. Meriden Record Company v. Browning, 249 A.2d 646 (Conn. 1971).
75. 523 N.Y.S.2d 954.
76. Industrial Found. of the S. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd.. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
77 88 Op. Att'y Gen. N.H. 039 (1988).
78. D.C LAW § 9-180 (1993).
79. D.C CODE AN% § 6-220 (1981).
80. Id.
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allow access of the death certificate to immediate family members, "legal
representatives", insurers, and vital statistic departments.81 While this legislation
will not resolve all conflicts, it provides courts with the means to avoid using an
inadequate balancing test.

CONCLUSION

An individual's right to access public records varies greatly from state to state.
In some states, access is freely granted to any applicant requesting such
information. In other states, the applicant must be able to demonstrate a direct
and tangible interest in the record sought. Still other states have enacted specific
regulations regarding what records are available and to whom these records are
available.
The District of Columbia, via D.C. Law 9-180, has placed itself in this last
category. By requiring two separate and distinct sections of the death certificate,
the District of Columbia has clearly recognized the importance of a separate
medical cause of death section. Additionally, the District of Columbia has
delineated under what circumstances this section will be available for disclosure.
This statute expressly states the intent of the legislature and provides the District
of Columbia courts with specific direction when deciding cases involving the
release of death certificates. In the future, expect to see other states following the
initiative of the District of Columbia by enacting similarly specific legislation.

81. Id. ("'legal representative" shall include an atitorney, physician, funeral director. or other
authorized agent acting in behalf of the registrant or his or her family").

